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Scholarship has argued that the Ottoman timar system was an efficient way to provide 
military forces in a non-monetized economy. As the state granted its sources of rev-
enue to timariots in return for military service, it was financially relieved of the need 
to pay the expenses of the cavalry. Several documents so far neglected by scholars and 
evidencing the practice of cash loans to timariots during military campaigns prove 
otherwise. This paper analyzes the process of the generation of timariots’ disposable 
income in the framework of actor-network theory. It is argued that the granting of 
loans demonstrated an attempt to regulate the cash flow of the timariot’s income dur-
ing campaigns, which was necessitated by problems of transforming tax revenues into 
disposable form. In the light of documents evidencing cash loans, it is further argued 
that cash loans reflect the vulnerability of the Ottoman timar system.
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If, during the course of heady conversation and drinking, friends used 
cajolery to encourage [Hayali] to obtain a high state office and appraise 
him as having precedence over his peers, he would say, “If it’s a worldly 
post [that you mean], the sound of its drum is a blinding headache, and 
command of it is a shackle on the feet.”1
Aşık Çelebi, Meşaʿirü’ş-Şuʿara, Hayali-i Maʿruf
∵
Aşık Çelebi’s words, cited in Stations of the Poets’ Pilgrimage, reflect the famous 
sixteenth-century poet Hayali’s (d. 1557) impression of revenue grants. For 
Hayali, grants were a shackle on the feet and the drum symbolizing the glory 
of the post was a blinding headache. The image of the ferocious sipahi (cav-
alryman) as depicted in Italian chronicles of the fifteenth century exercising 
his duty with the berat (warrant or appointment deed) of the sultan and the 
revenue grant in his pocket is a popular one. Why, then, would Hayali consider 
as a burden holding the prestigious official position of sancakbeyi (the highest 
administrator of a subprovince) in the Ottoman timar system? Indeed, some 
Ottoman primary documents concerning the payment of cash loans by the 
state to Ottoman timariots during the military campaigns, which have been 
neglected by historians so far, may provide us with insight into this question.
This paper has four main sections. The first is a brief review of our current 
knowledge of the Ottoman timar system, considering particularly its military 
features and its place in Ottoman state finance. The second explores the issue 
of cash loans made by the Ottoman state to timariots, drawing on evidence 
from chronicles, imperial decrees, records from mühimme defteri (registers of 
important affairs), and judicial court records. The third, inspired by John Law’s 
actor-network theory (ANT), regards the Ottoman timar as a complex system 
of human and nonhuman heterogeneous actor networks. The last section ana-
lyzes the process of the generation of Ottoman timariots’ disposable income 
in the context of heterogeneous networks as an attempt to explain possible 
factors necessitating the cash loans evidenced in section two. It is argued that 
the granting of loans reflects an attempt to regulate the cash flow of timariots’ 
1   Yaran ʿalem-i sohbetde ve dem-i ʿişretde baʿzı temvihat ile menasıb-ı ʿaliyeye tergib eyleseler ve 
emsaline teşbihat ile mukaddemat-ı husulin tertib eyleseler eğer dünyanın sancağıdur hakikat-ı 
avaz-ı tablı kurı “baş ağrısıdır,” serdarlığı “ayak bağı”dur dirdi. F. Kılıç, Aşık Çelebi, Meşaʿirü’ş-
Şuʾara, İnceleme-Metin (Istanbul: Istanbul Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Yayınları, 2010): 1545. 
Translation by Michael D. Sheridan.
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income during campaigns, necessitated by problems of transforming tax rev-
enues into disposable form. In the light of documents evidencing cash loans 
from the early sixteenth century to the late seventeenth, it is further argued 
that timariots’ need for cash reflects an inherent vulnerability in the system, 
independent of the sufficiency (or insufficiency) of tax allocations.
1  The Ottoman Timar System
Major research on the Ottoman timar system began with seminal works 
by Halil Inalcık and Ömer Lütfü Barkan.2 Darling argues that, “in the mid- 
twentieth century the timar was seen as the core issue in Ottoman history, the 
2   See C. Üçok, “Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatında Tımarlar.” Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi 
Dergisi 1/4 (1944): 525-51; M. Akdağ, “Tımar Rejiminin Bozuluşu.” AÜDTCF Dergisi 3/4 (1945): 
419-31; H. Inalcık, “1431 Tarihli Timar Defterine Göre Fatih Devrinden Önce Timar Sistemi.” In 
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Toplum ve Ekonomi Üzerinde Arşiv Çalışmaları, İncelemeler (Istanbul: 
Eren: 1993): 109-14; id., “Osmanlılar’da Raiyyet Rüsumu.” In Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Toplum 
ve Ekonomi: 31-66; id., “Köy, Köylü ve İmparatorluk.” In Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Toplum ve 
Ekonomi: 1-14; id., “The Çift-Hane System: The Organization of Ottoman Rural Society.” In An 
Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1600, ed. H. Inalcık and D. Quataert 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 143-54; id., “Tımar.” EI2 (Leiden: Brill, 2000): 
502-507; id., “The Provincial Administration and the Timar System.” In The Ottoman Empire, 
The Classical Age, 1300-1600, ed. Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1973): 104-18; Ö.L. Barkan, “Feodal Düzen ve Osmanlı Tımarı.” In Türkiye’de 
Toprak Meselesi: Toplu Eserler 1 (Istanbul: Gözlem, 1980): 873-95; id., “Tımar.” In Türkiye’de 
Toprak Meselesi: Toplu Eserler 1: 805-72; M.A. Kılıçbay, Feodalite ve Klasik Dönem Osmanlı 
Üretim Tarzı (Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1982); S. Divitçioğlu, Feodalite ve Klasik 
Dönem Osmanlı Üretim Tarzı (Istanbul: Teori, 1985); N. Beldiceanu, XIV. Yüzyıldan XVI. Yüzyıla 
Osmanlı Devletinde Tımar, trans. Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay (Ankara: Teori, 1985); D. Howard, “The 
Ottoman Timar System and Its Transformation, 1563-1656.” PhD diss. (Indiana University, 
1987); C.C. Aktan, “Osmanlı Tımar Sisteminin Mali Yönü.” Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Dergisi 
52 (1988): 69-78; H. İslamoğlu-İnan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire: Agrarian Power 
Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia During the Sixteenth 
Century (Leiden: Brill, 1994); A. Singer, Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials: Rural 
Administration around Sixteenth‐Century Jerusalem (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994); H. Cin and G. Akyılmaz, Tarihte Toplum ve Yönetim Tarzı Olarak Feodalite ve 
Osmanlı Düzeni (Konya: Selçuk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1995); M.Öz, XV-XVI. Yüzyıllarda Canik 
Sancağı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999); B. Aydın, “XVI. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Bürokrasisinde 
Tımar Tevcih Sistemi.” Osmanlı Araştırmaları Dergisi 24 (2004): 29-35; G. David and P. Fodor, 
“Changes in the Structure and Strength of the Timariot Army From the Early Sixteenth to 
the End of the Seventeenth Century.” Eurasian Studies 4/2 (2005): 157-88; M. Soyudoğan, 
“Reassessing the Timar System: The Case Study of Vidin (1455-1693).” PhD diss. (Ankara: 
Bilkent University, 2012).
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characteristic institution of the empire’s classical era; the device that united 
the military, the political, the economic and the social system; that made the 
empire successful, organized its resources, brought its people together, insured 
its prosperity, and created its identity.”3 Although previous interest produced 
substantial scholarship on the subject, Darling rightly notes that interest has 
faded, in spite of numerous questions that remain unanswered.4
Considering the scope and content of this paper, “timar” may be defined as 
a military-administrative system in which the sultan granted the tax revenues 
of state-owned land to timariots in return for fulfilling certain military obli-
gations. Ottomans themselves were more inclined to emphasize its military 
features. Earlier studies of the Ottoman timar system sought its roots in the 
older empires, especially the Seljukid and Byzantine, mainly because of the 
resemblances between Ottoman timar, the iqta5 of the Seljukids, and the pro-
noia of the Byzantines.6 Inalcık argued that the timar system was a common 
culture contributed to by ancient Persians, Byzantines, Western Europeans, 
the Islamic states, and Turco-Mongol states; it was apparently not unique to 
Ottomans.7 Their own practices developed under the influence of both pre-
Ottoman Turco-Islamic practices and the Byzantines.
It is possible to trace similarities between military-administrative systems 
not only across time in a particular geographical area but also across space 
during a given period. Similarities across space, in the vast geographical areas 
spanning from Western Europe to Far-East Asia, may be considered inevitable, 
given the production and transportation technologies available during the 
same period. In eastern Europe, for example, Muscovy’s military apparatus 
consisted of a cavalry of provincial landholders who possessed landed estates 
(pomest’ia) apportioned to them by the grand prince. The pomest’e system, orga-
nized initially during the late fifteenth century, was a conditional form of land 
3   L. Darling, “Nasihatnameler, Iċmal Defterleri, and the Timar-Holding Ottoman Elite in the 
Late Sixteenth Century.” Osmanlı Araştırmaları/The Journal of Ottoman Studies 43 (2014): 193.
4   Ibid.: 196. Although there are always unanswered questions in history, I believe her assertion 
rightly represents an implicit criticism of scholars in the field who suddenly put an end to 
institutional history studies and, without apology, developed a new tendency towards and 
interest in cultural-history studies.
5   For more on the iqta, see O. Turan, “İkta.” Islam Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 
1993): 949-59.
6   While some scholars, such as Köprülü, Üçok, Cin and Akyılmaz, Barkan, and Aktan empha-
size the Seljuk antecedents of timar, others, such as Deny, Cahen, Vryonis, and Imber, suggest 
that the Ottoman timar was an adaptation of the Byzantine pronoia.
7   H. Inalcık, “Tımar.” EI2 (Leiden: Brill, 2000): 502.
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tenure in which the holders of pomest’a (pomeshchiki) were expected to appear 
fully armed with horses and provisions when summoned to a campaign.8
In a similar approach, basing their claims on resemblances and differences 
between the timar and Western European feudalism, Ottoman historians began 
in the 1960s a hot debate on the question of Ottoman feudalism.9 Although 
several studies on the question expanded our understanding of timar as a 
socio-economic system, in the end, no consensus could be reached. This is not 
surprising, though, as feudalism was itself an abstraction constructed in the 
seventeenth century, mainly by legal scholars.10 However skeptical one may 
have been about the use of the term and however aware of the difficulties asso-
ciated with defining the term, it remained a key concept for the study of the 
Middle Ages.11 Historians also compared societies in their search for similar 
8    The Muscovite pomest’ia system is chosen as an example particularly because of its fiscal 
and military similarities to the Ottoman timar system during roughly the period under 
consideration. For more on the pomest’e system, see J. Martin, “Widows, Welfare, and the 
‘Pomest’e’ System in the Sixteenth Century.” Harvard Ukranian Studies 19 (1995): 375-88; 
id., “Economic Effectiveness of the Muscovite Pomest’e System: An Examination of Estate 
Incomes and Military Expenses in the Mid-16th Century.” In Warfare in Eastern Europe, 
1500-1800, ed. Brian Davies (Leiden: Brill, 2012): 19-34. For a comprehensive comparision 
between the Ottoman Empire and Russia regarding military fiscal and bureaucratic- 
institutional transformation and the changing role of the central government between 
c.1500-c.1800, see G. Agoston, “Military Transformation in the Ottoman Empire and 
Russia, 1500-1800.” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 12/2 (2011): 281-319.
9    Some scholars, including Barkan and Cin and Akyılmaz, claimed that Ottoman society 
could not be regarded as feudal because the actual ownership (rakaba) of the land was 
vested in the Ottoman state, and the timariot did not have jurisdictional rights. Marxist 
historians, including Divitçioğlu and Berktay, suggested, on the other hand, that Ottoman 
society had feudal characteristics; they positioned their analyses in the framework of 
either the feudal mode of production or Marx’s Asiatic mode of production. Inalcık, how-
ever, offered the model of a “çift-hane system” as an alternative to the Marxist conception 
of “mode of production,” in which the çift-hane represents the most basic unit of produc-
tion, consisting of a family (hane), a pair of oxen (çift), and a piece of land (çiftlik). For 
more on the çifthane system, see H. Inalcık, “Osmanlılar’da Raiyyet Rüsumu.” In Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu Toplum ve Ekonomi: 31-66; id., “The Çift-Hane System: The Organization of 
Ottoman Rural Society.” In An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire: 143-54.
10   Although many scholars were uncomfortable with the use of the term, the discomfort 
was first openly expressed by Brown (1974) and later developed by Reynolds (1994). See 
R. Abels, “The Historiography of a Construct: “Feudalism” and the Medieval Historian.” 
History Compass 7/3 (2009): 1008-31.
11   For some of the major studies on feudalism, see M. Bloch, Feudal Society, vol. 1, trans. 
L.A. Manyon. (London: Routledge, 1978); F.L. Ganshof, Feudalism. trans. P. Grierson (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1964); F.M. Stenton, The First Century of English Feudalism 1066-1166 
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“feudal” societies elsewhere.12 Discussions of Western or Ottoman feudalism or 
a comparative analysis of feudal societies elsewhere with timar system are not, 
however, within the scope of this paper, which is instead an attempt to under-
stand the institution of the Ottoman timar and the relationships established 
within this system rather than questioning whether it was feudal or not, with 
occasional references made to similar military practices, if deemed necessary.13
Inalcık defines “timar,” a word of Persian origin meaning literally “care, 
attention,” as nonhereditary prebends used to sustain a cavalry and a military-
administrative hierarchy in the core provinces of the Ottoman Empire and gives 
the Turkish equivalent of the term as dirlik, meaning “livelihood” or “means 
of support.”14 In the timar system, the sultan granted tax revenues of a tract of 
state-owned (miri) land to members of the military class (askeri) in return for 
military and administrative services. Such grants of tax revenues15 were called 
timar, zeamet, or hass, depending on the amount of revenue they generated, 
timar being the smallest, granted to the common cavalryman. However, all 
grants, regardless of their size, were referred to generally in Ottoman docu-
ments as either timar or dirlik. The grantees were therefore referred to as dirlik 
owners, whether single cavalrymen, regimental commanders (alaybeyi), or 
provincial governors (beylerbeyi). The sultan was also a dirlik owner, of crown 
lands (padişah hassı).16 The main difference between timar holders (timariots) 
and zeamet or hass holders was that the rights to zeamet and hass grants was 
limited to the period of the owners’ service. For example, the rights to the hass 
grants of any dismissed grand vizier were to be transferred to his replacement. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932); C. Stephenson, Mediaeval Feudalism (Ithaca NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1942); J.R. Strayer, Western Europe in the Middle Ages: A Short 
History (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955).
12   For a comparative historical analysis of “feudalisms” in Russia, the Byzantine Empire, 
China, and Japan, see R. Coulborn, ed., Feudalism in History (Hamden CT: Archon Books, 
1965). The scholars who contributed were, however, all aware of the problems with the 
use of the term “feudalism”; Strayer and Coulborn, in their introductory comments 
regarded comparative work as “an attempt to test the hypothesis that the methods of feu-
dalism may have been applied, in whole or in part, outside Western Europe.” J. Strayer and 
R. Coulborn, “The Idea of Feudalism”: 3.
13   Abels suggested that asking the question whether any society was feudal was less mean-
ingful than understanding the institutions and relationships within that society in its his-
torical context. R. Abels, “The Historiography of a Construct”: 1025.
14   H. Inalcık, “Tımar.” EI2: 502.
15   Borrowing from medieval European history, Howard translated such grants as benefices. 
D. Howard, “The Ottoman Timar System and Its Transformation”: 8.
16   Ö. Ergenç, XVI. Yüzyıl Sonlarında Bursa (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2014): 149.
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The rights of the timar-holding sipahi on the other hand were hereditary and 
could be passed from father to son under specified conditions, and the heir 
could not be dispossessed unless he violated the law.17
The tax income of the empire was divided into three in terms of the recipi-
ents: the sultan, the remaining dirlik owners (high state officials, zeamet 
 owners, and timariots), and the evkaf (pious foundations, sing. vakf ). Drawing 
his findings from the budget of the fiscal year 1527-28, Barkan showed that 
49.8% of the total tax revenue of the empire was generated from the lands of 
dirlik owners, 39.9% from crown lands (the main source of income of the cen-
tral treasury), and 10.3% from pious foundations.18 The tax income generated 
from vakf lands was spent for religious, health, educational, and other sorts of 
public service.19
The dirlik owners were obligated to join military campaigns in return 
for grants of tax revenue. They were also supposed to supply auxiliary men 
(cebelü)—using the income generated from their tax allocations—depending 
on the size of their dirliks.20 Most of the Ottoman army in the provinces during 
the classical period consisted of timariots.21 Research so far on Ottoman insti-
tutional history reiterates the argument that the timariots forming the cavalry 
did not need financial support from the state; rather, it was the salaried stand-
ing army that needed cash from central treasury, at least until the late seven-
teenth century, when dissolution of the system became apparent.
However, several documents—such as imperial decrees ( ferman) and 
regulations regarding the repayment of cash loans made to the timariots dur-
ing military campaigns which were conducted at various times and places— 
challenge this assertion, as discussed in the next section.
17   H. Inalcık and D. Quataert, eds. 1994. An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman 
Empire: 115.
18   The income generated from Egypt is not included in these numbers, but, if it is included 
in the total revenue of the empire, the income generated from crown lands increases 
to 51% and that from dirlik owners decreases to 37%. Ö.L. Barkan, “Tımar.” In Türkiye’de 
Toprak Meselesi: Toplu Eserler 1: 805-72.
19   H. Inalcık, “The Provincial Administration and the Timar System.” In The Ottoman Empire: 
The Classical Age: 109.
20   Ibid.: 113.
21   For example, there were, in the year 1527-28, according to official Ottoman reports, 37,521 
timar-holding sipahis, and the total number of soldiers in the army during this period 
is estimated at 70,000-80,000, including the cebelüs. Ö.L. Barkan. “Tımar.” In Türkiye’de 
Toprak Meselesi: Toplu Eserler 1: 805-72.
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2  Cash Loans Made to the Ottoman Timariots
The following text from Tacü’t-tevarih, an Ottoman chronicle, provides detailed 
information about the cash loans made to the timariots during the Çaldıran 
campaign of 1517:22
During the conquest of Egypt, besides the sultan’s compensation in cash 
(bahşiş-i ʿamm-ı padişahi), loans were made by the Imperial Treasury23 
to Rumelian timariots who could not benefit from their own sources of 
income (dirliks), because their dirliks were far away and the routes of the 
campaign were long. Rumelian judges were entrusted with the task of 
organizing the repayment of loans—sometimes large—previously made 
to timariots. Imperial decrees ( ferman) were issued on how the loans 
should be repaid and sent to the mentioned judges. It was ordered that 
the agents of dirlik owners should collect the tax payments on behalf 
of the timariots and that one judge from each subprovince should deliver 
the collected amount immediately to the Palace in Istanbul.
The first question that arises is whether or not this practice implemented in 
1517, when the timar as an institution was regarded as functional and efficient 
in maintaining an army, was exceptional: the recurring practice of making 
loans in the succeeding periods is evidence that it was not exceptional.
In a record24 from the mühimme register dated 1569, the vizier, Mustafa 
Pasha, is ordered to make disbursements from the Aleppo treasury  amounting 
22   Şah-ı kişvergir azm-i teshir-i Mısr ittiğü eyyamda Rumili sipahilerine bahşiş-i ʿamm-ı 
padişahiden gayri tımarları dur ve buʿd-ı mekanla mahsullerinden intifaʿ gayr-i makdur 
olmağın, Hızane-i Amiremden karz vechi üzere herkese meblağ-ı vafi verilmiş idi. Ve ol 
mebaliğ-i mevfure tahsili içün Rumili kadılarına ahkam-ı şerifde iblağ buyurulmuş idi ki 
 istikraz iden sipahilerin tımarları mahsulatını vekilleri ve subaşıları marifetiyle cemʿ idüp, 
her sancakdan bir kadı livası mahsulunu ale’t-taʿcil Bab-ı vacibi’t-tebcil savbına getüre. Hoca 
Saadettin Efendi, Tacü’t Tevarih (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1869): 2:377.
23   There were two imperial Ottoman treasuries, the internal treasury (İç Hazine, called 
also Hazine-i Enderun and Hazine-i Hassa), controlled and managed by the sultan, and 
the external or central treasury (Dış Hazine, called also Miri Hazine, Divan-ı Hümayun 
Hazinesi, Hazine-i Birun, and Taşra Hazinesi), which was managed by the grand vizier 
and the head of financial administration. A. Tabakoğlu, “Osmanlı Devletinin İç Hazinesi.” 
In Osmanlı Maliyesi Kurumlar ve Bütçeler 1, ed. M. Genç and E. Özvar (Istanbul: Osmanlı 
Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2006): 51.
24   Vezirüm Mustafa Paşa’ya hüküm ki: . . . Buyurdum ki: . . . sipahi tayifesinden lazim oldukda, 
Haleb Hazinesi’nden taʿyin olunan yüz bin filoriden karz tarikıyla olıgelen adet ü kanun üzre 
timarlarına göre tevziʿ idüp esamisiyle timar nahıyesin ve karyesin ve yazusın defter idüp 
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to 100,000 flori as loans to timariots participating in the Yemen campaign and 
to see that each payment be properly recorded, including the amount, the 
name of the timar holder, and his village.
Similar cases appear in other Ottoman mühimme registers. In another 
record,25 from a mühimme register dated 1578 and addressed to Tırhala Beyi, 
he is ordered to disburse loans amounting to 45,000 kuruş to alaybegs, zeamet 
holders, and timariots who were participating in the eastern and the Şirvan 
campaigns and to take the utmost care in recording those payments in a reg-
ister. It is further ordered that he should ensure that, if the timar grants were 
expropriated and transferred to someone else, they should be transferred 
together with their associated liabilities.
For example, imperial decrees26 were issued in 1639 to regulate the settle-
ment of the loans made by the internal treasury to zaims (zeamet holders), and 
timariots during the army’s return from the Baghdad campaign. The address-
ees of these decrees were the Rumeli beylerbeyi (governor of province), the 
sancakbeys (governor of sub-province) of İşkodra, Vulçitrin, Vidin, Selanik, 
Alacahisar, Dukakin, Prezrin, Üsküp, Elvine, Vize, Kırkkilise, Niğbolu and the 
judges in these sancaks. In other words, it included almost all of the officials 
in Rumeli Beylerbeyliği (province), depicting vividly the financial difficulties 
faced by the Rumelian timariots. It was ordered that the sum of the loans pre-
viously made by the internal treasury to zeamet and timar holders on their 
üzerlerine ne mikdar altun virildüğin kaydeyleyesin. H.B. Yıldırım et al., eds. 7 Numaralı 
Mühimme Defteri (975-976/1567-1569), Özet-Transkripsiyon-İndeks (Ankara: Osmanlı Arşivi 
Daire Başkanlığı, 1999): 40.
25   Tırhala beğine hüküm ki: bundan akdem asakir-i mansureye serdar olan . . . vezirim 
Mustafa Paşa . . . ile diyar-ı şarka ve Şirvan taraflarına seferde bile olup bi’l-fiʿl kışlakda olan 
sancakların alaybeğilerine ve züʿama ve erbab-ı timara karz tariki ile harçlık virilmek içün 
hızane-i amiremden kırk beş bin guruş ihrac eyleyüp. . . . Tokat’da sana irsal olunmuşdur. 
Buyurdum ki, varup vusul buldukda Ohri beğine ve Avlonya beğilerine irsal olunan 
guruşdan . . . kifayet mikdarı guruş virüp . . . her birine ne mikdar akçe karz virildüğin defter 
eyleyüp . . . Amma hin-i tevziʿ de züʿama ve erbab-ı timarın ism ü resmleri ve zeʿamet ve 
timarları ve karyelerin defter eylemekde ihtimam idesin. Sonra zeʿamet ve timarları ahara 
virildüği takdirde karz virilen harçlık zeʿamet ve timarlarından alınur ve zeʿamet ve timarları 
ahara tevcih olundukda ol şartla tevcih oluna ve sancak beğlere ne mikdar harçlık virilürse 
anı dahi deftere kayd idesin. Ş. Izgi, “986 (1578) Tarihli 32 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri, 
[s. 201-400], Transkripsiyonu ve Değerlendirmesi.” Master’s thesis (Istanbul: Marmara 
University, 2006): 101-102.
26   These twelve decrees are held in Topkapı Palace Archive (MS E.5207/1-12) and is described 
by I. Aydoğmuş, “Osmanlı Devletinde Timar Erbabına Hazineden Verilen Borçlar ve Geri 
Alınması: Sultan IV. Murat’ın Bağdat Seferi Örneği.” Paper presented at the 20th CIÉPO 
Symposium, Rethymno: Crete, 2012.
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return from the Baghdad campaign be collected, placed in sealed sacks, and 
transported to Istanbul to be submitted to the internal treasury.27
Having established that loans were made to timariots poses another signifi-
cant question—whether this practice was limited to the timariots of Rumelia. 
Apart from the decree of 1569 mentioned above, in which the origins of the 
timariots were not specified, the remaining examples used so far refer to 
Rumelian timariots participating in campaigns on the empire’s far eastern 
front. However, there is one other record, dated January 1684, that provides 
explicit evidence of loans made to Anatolian timariots (from the provinces of 
Anatolia, Sivas, Karaman, Adana, and Maraş). The evidence consists of a let-
ter written by the kethüda (administrator) of the internal treasury to Sultan 
Mehmed IV, requesting disbursement from that treasury of 250,000 kuruş and 
the sultan’s written consent for that payment.28
Although Tabakoğlu notes loans to timariots unable to collect taxes before 
campaigns, he concludes that it was a rare and unusual practice until late sev-
enteenth century.29 Documents dated 1517, 1569, 1578, 1639, and 1684 evidenc-
ing cash loans to Ottoman timariots during campaigns prove otherwise. It thus 
seems that state loans were frequently made even before the late seventeenth 
century. Even more striking, the decree dated 1569 in particular mentions the 
granting of these loans as appropriate according to law and custom (olugelen 
adet ve kanun üzere), which further supports the idea that it was not an unusual 
practice.
Are these documents sufficient to show that making cash loans to timari-
ots on military campaigns was a usual practice? Can we find additional sup-
porting evidence? Should we dismiss the documents, which date from the 
early sixteenth century to the late seventeenth century, even if they suggest a 
customary practice? Scholars may have neglected this practice because there 
was no series of registers of the disbursement and settlement of such loans. 
27   Bundan akdem Bağdat seferinden avdet olundukda liva-i mezburun züʿama ve erbab-ı 
tımarına İç Hazine-i Amiremden karz tarikiyle virilen . . . guruşu cemʿ ve tahsil ve der-kise 
idüb, ve mühürleyüp ber vech-i taʿcil der saadete irsal ve İç Hazine-i Amireye teslim ettirmek. 
Topkapı Palace Archive MS E.5207/8.
28   Request for disbursement: Anadolu’da vakiʿ mirimiran ve mirliva kullarına karz-ı şerʿiden 
100,000 kuruş ve zikrolunan sancaklarda miralay ve züʿama ve erbab-ı tımar ve defter 
olunduğu üzere 5,000 nefer olup birbirlerinin kefaletleri ile beher nefere 30 kuruş bu cümle 
250,000 kuruş, 500 kese olmak üzere Enderun-i hümayun hazinesinden ihsan buyurulur ise 
ferman devletlü ve saadetlü sultanım hazretlerinindir. Approval of Sultan Mehmed IV: 
“Hazine kethüdası karz olmak üzere 500 kese teslim edesin Defterdar Paşa’ya 3 m sene 96.” 
İ.H. Uzunçarşılı, “Osmanlı Devleti Maliyesinin Kuruluşu ve Osmanlı Devleti İç Hazinesi.” 
Belleten 42 (1978): 92.
29   A. Tabakoğlu, “Osmanlı Devletinin İç Hazinesi”: 52.
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Unfortunately, it seems that the record-keeping system of the internal trea-
sury was not as complex and sophisticated as that of the central treasury, thus 
making it more difficult to trace the transfers from the internal to the  central 
 treasury in detail, at least for the loans made to timariots.30 We do not yet have a 
full grasp of the procedures followed and the record-keeping practices of trans-
actions of the internal treasury. Therefore, the scarcity of documents should 
not be deemed as insignificant. We may find only scattered information, espe-
cially on the issue of making cash loans to timariots. This is the main reason 
that several other primary documents—such as chronicles, important affair 
registers, judicial court records, and imperial decrees, rather than internal and 
central treasury registers—have been used as evidence in this paper. Instead 
of dismissing a number of documents evidencing cash loans to timariots, this 
paper attempts to explain the possible reasons behind such a necessity.
Scholars have so far relied mostly upon law codes (kanunname), survey reg-
isters (tahrir), and timar daybook-registers (ruznamçe defterleri) in their explo-
rations of the Ottoman timar system. Such sources provide valuable insights 
into the theoretical design of this system. Although we know the amount of 
taxes granted to timariots in detail, we do not know whether they were col-
lected in full. We do not know when the timariot could collect in full the tax 
in kind and store it in his warehouse or when he could take the grain to the 
nearest bazaar (akreb bazar) and actually convert tax in kind to cash for his 
disposable income. Moreover, we know nothing about the terms of his sale 
agreements with various buyers in the market. To this long list of lacunae we 
can add our ignorance as to whether the timariots could actually manage 
the effective collection of taxes in their absence during military campaigns. 
Despite our poor knowledge of such matters, there is no evidence of recurrent 
complaints that would lead one to question the adequacy of timar allocations, 
30   In some of the primary sources, it is stated that the loans are made by the Hızane-i Amire 
(central treasury), while in others loans are made by the İç Hazine-i Amire (internal trea-
sury). In still others, loans are made by the provincial treasuries (e.g., Aleppo). Usually, 
however, loans were made by the internal treasury, because the primary function of that 
treasury was to supplement the central treasury when necessary. The most comprehensive 
research regarding the Ottoman internal treasury has been done by Uzunçarşılı, “Osmanlı 
Devleti Maliyesinin Kuruluşu ve Osmanlı Devleti İç Hazinesi.” Belleten 42 (1978): 67-93. 
He explains that the internal treasury had several divisions and that the head treasurer 
(baş hazinedar) of the Inner Palace (Enderun) was the administrator of all the divisions. 
The records and registers of the internal treasury were kept by the Hazine Kethüdası, who 
reported directly to the sultan. He was also expected to keep the head accountant of the 
external treasury informed.
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at least until the late sixteenth century.31 The dissolution of the timar system 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the result of many internal 
and external factors beginning in the late sixteenth century, such as evolving 
military technology32 and the devaluation of the currency leading to the ero-
sion of the real value of timar revenues.33 This is consistent with the evidence 
of the use of credit in 1684, but the use of credit in 1517, for example, seems to 
denote a different problem, independent of the sufficiency of tax revenues. 
John Law’s actor-network theory might serve as an appropriate framework to 
explore further the possible need for cash loans.
3  Human and Nonhuman Networks in the Timar System
John Law, a sociologist and a key proponent of actor-network theory, pre-
sumes that “all social, organizational, scientific and technological structures, 
31   Martin raised the problem of sufficiency in pomest’e system. She examined the expenses 
pomeshchiki incurred to meet their military obligations and compared them with their 
estate incomes to assess whether the pomeshchiki could afford financially their military 
service. A regulation issued in 1555-56 regarding Muscovy’s military service required that 
each landholder supply additional armed men and horses, depending on the amount 
of productive land in his possession. She argued that, although the pomest’e system was 
functioning successfully in the mid-sixteenth century, the implementation of new regu-
lations for military service and land tenure imposed a burden on pomeshchiki; for many 
of them, supplemental government stipends or salaries had become a necessary part of 
their incomes. J. Martin, “Economic Effectiveness of the Muscovite Pomest’e System”: 34.
32   For Ottoman military power see: G. Agoston, “1453-1826 Avrupa’da Osmanlı Savaşları.” 
In Top, Tüfek ve Süngü. Yeniçağ’da Savaş Sanatı 1453-1815, trans. Yavuz Alagan (Istanbul: 
Kitap Yayınevi, 2003): 128-54; id., Guns for the Sultan Military Power and Weapons Industry 
in the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); id., “Military 
Transformation in the Ottoman Empire and Russia, 1500-1800.” Kritika: Explorations in 
Russian and Eurasian History 12/2 (2011): 281-319; V. Aksan, “Ottoman War and Warfare 
1453-1812.” In War in the Early Modern World 1453-1815, ed. J. Black (London: University 
College, 1999): 147-75; id., Ottoman Wars 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged (Harlow UK: 
Pearson Educata, 2008); R. Murphey, Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700 (London: University 
College London Press, 1999); G. David and P. Fodor, “Changes in the Structure and Strength 
of the Timariot Army From the Early Sixteenth to the End of the Seventeenth Century.” 
Eurasian Studies 4/2 (2005): 157-88; G. David, “Ottoman Armies and Warfare, 1453-1603.” 
In Cambridge History of Turkey, vol. 2: The Ottoman Empire as a World Power, 1453-1603, 
ed. S. Faroqhi and K. Fleet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013): 276-320.
33   On the erosion of the real value of timar allocations in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, see H. Inalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 
1600-1700.” Archivum Ottomanicum 6 (1980): 283-337.
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even processes and events, are formed from heterogeneous networks.” Law’s 
metaphor of heterogeneous networks, which lies at the heart of ANT, is a way 
of suggesting that society, organizations, agents, and machines are all effects 
generated in a patterned network of diverse (both human and nonhuman) 
materials.34 In this theory, materials, technology, and communication sys-
tems are also considered actor networks; this is what mainly differentiates it 
from the theory of social network analysis.35 He further argues that “orders” 
(in its plural), be it a social order, an organization or a system, survive as long 
as they overcome resistance in these networks because any effort of ordering 
encounters its limits and struggles to overcome or accept those limits and thus 
liable to breakdown.36 His notion of heterogeneous networks is also applica-
ble to the Ottoman timar system for a systematic analysis of the generation of 
the timariot’s disposable income, because his theory considers not only sev-
eral human networks established within the system but also the technology 
(production and communication) of the period as a constraint. Any flaw in 
actor networks remained as a threat to the well-functioning of the timar as a 
 system.37 The key issue is to identify these actor networks.
3.1 Human Networks
The timar system served, above all, to define relations based on tax payments. 
The most fundamental network in this system was established between the 
state, the dirlik owner, and the tax-paying subjects (reaya). Although reaya 
denotes all tax-paying subjects, both the peasants as cultivators and urban pro-
ducers, most of the reaya living on lands allocated to the timariots were peas-
ants. The terms “peasant” and reaya are used interchangeably in this paper. 
34   J. Law, “Notes on the Theory of the Actor Network: Ordering, Strategy and Heterogeneity.” 
(Lancester: Centre for Science Studies, Lancaster University, 1992): 2-5. http://www.comp 
.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/papers/Law-Notes-on-ANT.pdf.
35   For a comparision of social-network analysis and actor-network theory, see T. Seçilmişler 
and Z. Yenen, “Koruma Sorunsalına İlişkin Kuramsal Bir Değerlendirme: Kurumsalcı 
(Alan Yönetimi) ve Çoğulcu (Aktör Ağ Teorisi) Yaklaşımlarının Karşılaştırılması.” Sigma 
3 (2011): 375-84.
36   J. Law, “Notes on the Theory of the Actor Network”: 5.
37   Although the timar system as a whole included all the tax revenues granted to military 
members and even the sultan himself, this paper focuses only on the grant revenues of 
timariots. One of the reasons for this choice is their numerical predominance, but even 
more important is the fact that, because hass and zeamets were usually granted to high 
state officials, their income included not only the öşr tax, an agricultural tax collected in 
kind, but also some taxes collected in cash, such as the ihtisab or bac (market tax), and the 
gümrük (customs tax). The income of timariots was thus the lowest in absolute terms and 
the most vulnerable to resistances incurred during its collection.
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As stated previously, although the dirlik owner denotes every military class 
member possessing a tax revenue grant, including the sultan himself, the term 
refers in this article mainly to common timariots, unless otherwise specified.
In this complex relation based on tax, the state, the peasant and the dirlik 
owner were simultaneously exercising different rights to land. The title (rak-
aba) of land in this system belonged to the state, while the right to the usu-
fruct (tasarruf )—that is, the cultivation and exploitation of land—belonged 
to the peasant who had, in return, an obligation to pay a portion of his income 
as tax to the dirlik owner. The dirlik owner, on the other hand, was entitled 
to tax revenues generated from the land cultivated by the peasant in return 
for administrative and military services. The income of the dirlik owner was 
derived only from the taxes explicitly defined in his berat, and the relationship 
between the timariot and the dirlik owner was clearly defined in the edicts of 
justice (adaletname).
One such edict, dated 1648, shows the obligations of both parties, reflecting 
the theoretical model of the timar system.38 The edict states that the reaya 
should recognize his timariot as his master (ulu’l emr), a representative of the 
state, and show him respect and honor (ulu’l-emr bilüb, izzet ve hürmet  itmekde). 
The reaya was expected to refrain from behaving obstinately or opposing his 
master (sözlerine inad ve muhalefet idüb). The reaya would pay the tithe (öşr) 
and other taxes in full and on time, without excuse. Any contrary act would 
be considered disobedience (ihtilaf ) or rebellion (ihtilal). The reaya was also 
obligated to build a granary for his timariot to store the tithe, to transport the 
tithe to the nearest market (akreb bazar), and to place it wherever the dirlik 
owner demanded.
The timariot would, in return, provide protection to the reaya; this was his 
foremost obligation.39 The timariot thus acted as the representative of the 
state, and his rights and obligations were clearly specified in the berats issued 
by the sultan.40 The timariot did not have jurisdiction over the reaya:41 it was 
only the kadıs (judges) who had the right to adjudicate. In case of dispute, 
both the timariot and the reaya had the right to appeal to the judiciary court to 
38   H. Inalcık, “Adaletnameler.” In Osmanlı’da Devlet, Hukuk, Adalet (Istanbul: Eren, 2000): 
169-70.
39   Ö. Ergenç, XVI. Yüzyıl Sonlarında Bursa: 136.
40   Ibid.: 146.
41   Some scholars, such as Cin and Akyılmaz, have argued that the Ottoman timar was not 
“feudal,” basing their claims on the timariots’ lack of jurisdiction over peasants in the 
Ottoman case. H. Cin and G. Akyılmaz, Tarihte Toplum ve Yönetim Tarzı Olarak Feodalite 
ve Osmanlı Düzeni (Konya: Selçuk University, 1995).
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demand justice. Whether the system as prescribed in the law codes reflected 
practice remains to be answered.
When the dirlik owner joined a military campaign or was otherwise away 
from his dirlik, he could delegate his authority to his agent (vekil or subaşı).42 
The legal owner of a right—defined in the warrants—could legally delegate 
his authority to one or more agents, a practice widespread in the Ottoman 
Empire. In such cases, the dirlik owner, as the legal owner of tax-collection 
rights, issued a letter to his delegate: the reaya would recognize the delegate’s 
authority only upon the issuance of such a letter, and the relation between 
agent and peasant was one of the human networks in the system.
If the dirlik owner ran out of cash during a campaign, he usually appointed 
someone to deliver the already collected tax revenues in cash to one of the halt-
ing places on the army’s campaign route. These agents were called harçlıkçı.43 
The network of relations formed between the dirlik owner and the harçlıkçı 
was another human network in the timar system. Usually, dirlik owners from 
the same or nearby locations would appoint a common agent, making the 
system more affordable. During a long-distance military campaign, delivering 
cash might be dangerous. The success of the delivery depended on many fac-
tors, such as the nature of the tax to be collected, the timing of the tax collec-
tion, and even the trustworthiness of the harçlıkçı. Judicial records reflect the 
inevitable conflicts arising from this venture. A court record dated 5 April 1685 
in the Konya court registers concerns the harçlıkçı of fifteen timariots from 
Konya who were on the Austrian campaign.44 In this record, Osman Ağa, the 
42   Ö. Ergenç, “XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Taşra Yönetiminin Mali Nitelikleri.” In Osmanlı Tarihi 
Yazıları Şehir, Toplum, Devlet (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012): 369.
43   The harçlıkçı was a man delegated to collect the tax income generated from the dirliks 
of timariots when they were on military campaigns. M.A. Unal, Osmanlı Tarihi Sözlüğü 
(Istanbul: Paradigma, 2011): 295. For the only published work on the harçlıkçı, see 
G. Veinstein, “L’hivernage en campagne: Talon d’Achille du système militaire ottoman 
classique. A propos des Sipāhi ̄ de Roumélie en 1559-1560.” Studia Islamica 58 (1983): 
109-48. I am thankful to Amy Singer for bringing this article to my attention.
44   Mahmiye-i Konya sakinlerinden erbab-ı timardan hala Sefer-i hümayunda olan on beş 
neferin harclıkcısı olan. . . . Osman Ağa meclis-i şerʿde Ahmed Ağa nam kimesnenin timarına 
subaşısı olan Hüdavirdi bin Ali mahzarında takrir-i kelam ve taʿbir-i ʿani’l-meram idüb ben 
erbab-ı timar olub hala sefer-i hümayunda olan Ahmed Ağa tarafından harclıkcı olub 
timarına mezkur Hüdavirdi subaşısı olmağla harclık taleb eylediğimde bana mezbur içün 
on guruş virüb ziyade taleb eylediğimde muhalefet ider sual olunub takriri tahrir olunması 
matlubumdur didikde gıbbe’s-sual mezbur cevabında ben merkum Ahmed Ağa’nın subaşısı 
olub lakin aʿşar ve rüsumdan asla bir akçe ve bir habbe makbuzum olmamağla kendi 
malımdan on guruş tedarik idüb mezbur Ahmed Ağa’ya isal içün merkum Osman Ağa’ya 
virüb teslim eyledim bundan ziyade virmeğe iktidarım yokdur dimeğin ma-vakʿa hafza li’l-
makal bi’t-taleb ketb olundu fi’l-yevmi’s-samin min Cemaziye’l- evvel li sene sitte ve tisʿin ve 
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delegated harçlıkçı of these fifteen timariots, took to court the subaşı Hüdavirdi 
bin Ali, who was the appointed tax collector of the timariots. The harçlıkçı, as 
the plaintiff, declared that the subaşı paid him only ten guruş, although he 
had requested 15 guruş, and he demanded the remaining five guruş. However, 
the defendant, subaşı Hüdavirdi bin Ali, rejected the claim, stating that he had 
already paid ten guruş to the harçlıkçı, adding that he made the payment from 
his own pocket, because the taxes had not yet been collected and he was finan-
cially unable to pay the balance. In this case, the tax collector clearly had to 
provide the stipulated tax amount before his collection was completed. The 
financial needs of the campaigning timariot are thus clearly indicated, along-
side the risks taken by tax collectors.
The timariots usually sold the grain collected as tax in kind to the bakers 
(habbaz) in the nearest city or town. The relation between timariots and bak-
ers (established in the process of converting tax in kind into cash as the timar-
iot’s disposable income) represents another human network in the system. 
Although we have little empirical information regarding the terms of the sales 
agreement between them, we can assume that these contracts were usually 
made on the basis of credit in a non-monetized economy.
The following example illustrates the difficulty faced in this process by the 
descendants of owners of timars and zeamets. In a case of inheritance dating 
to 1750, a woman named Ayşe claims her inheritance from the income of her 
deceased husband, a certain Ivaz Kethüda. Apparently, Ivaz Kethüda, a timar-
iot, before his death made a tax-farming contract (iltizam) with two men col-
lectively, Hasan Kethüda and El-Hac Mehmed.45 These two tax farmers sold on 
credit to people from the neighborhood and the city the grain they collected as 
tax in kind, but Ivaz Kethüda died before the actual date of payment. His wife 
Ayşe came into dispute with them when she requested her share from the tax 
farmers. The parties finally settled the dispute for 100 guruş.46
elf. M.A. Güven, “33 No’lu Konya Şeriyye Sicili Değerlendirme ve Transkripsiyon.” Master’s 
thesis (Kayseri: Selçuk University, 2006): 289.
45   It was a widespread practice for the timariots to farm out their tax revenues, which is 
also evidenced by numerous fetvas (fatwas) issued on the disputes between timariots 
and mültezims (tax-farmer). For other examples, see K. Akpınar, “İltizam in the Fetvas of 
Ottoman Şeyhülislams.” Master’s thesis (Ankara: Bilkent University, 2000): 42-58.
46   Medine-i Ankara hısnı sakinlerinden iken bundan akdem vefat iden İvaz Kethüda . . . nam 
müteveffanın (varislerinin) vekili. . . . Usulzade İbrahim Ağa meclis-i şer’de müteveffa-i 
mezburun hal-i hayatında baʿzı tımar ve zeʿamet mahsulünü iltizamda şerikleri olan. . . . 
Hasan Kethüda . . . ve El-hac Mehmed . . . nam kimesneler mahzarlarında bi’l-vekale ikrar 
idüb, müvekkilem mezburenin zevci müteveffa-i mezbur İvaz Kethüda hal-i hayatında 
şerikleri mezburan Hasan Kethüda ve El-hac Mehmed ile müşterekün fihi oldukları tımar 
ve zeʿamet mahsulünden maʿlumü’l-aded ve’l-mikdar hınta ve şairi ahali-i kura ve mısrdan 
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The previous case makes it apparent that the relation between the timariot 
and the buyer on credit (zimem-i nas) is yet another actor network in the 
system. Deferred revenue of the timariot represents a flaw in the collection 
process of disposable income of the timariot and thus a threat to the well-
functioning of the timar system. It seems that the tax collected in kind was not 
easily and quickly converted into cash. Although we do not know the terms of 
the original contract, the date of this record, 11 October, shows that the dispos-
able income of the timariot had not yet been generated in full by mid-October.
Figure 1 illustrates several human networks in the timar system. Any flaw 
in any one of the actor networks subjects the system to the risk of dissolution. 
Indeed, court cases showing disputes within these actor networks are but a 
reflection of resistances to the system as a whole. The nonhuman networks are 
additional resistances to the system, as laid out in the next section.
3.2  Nonhuman Networks
Technology constitutes the nonhuman network in this system. Transportation 
technology based on human and animal power made it harder to reach the 
baʿzı kimesnelere nüsheten kıymet-i malume ile bey ve teslim, anlar dahi baʿde’l-şıra ve’l-
kabul ale’l-esami ala haddihi defter olunub, her birileri ecel-i müsemma tamamında tah-
sil ve kabza mütekarrib iken kabl-i hulu’l-u’l-ecl şerik-i mezbur İvaz Kethüda fevt olub, 
mahsul-i mezbur kıymetinden zimem-i nasda olan sülüs hisse-i muayyenesini ber muceb-i 
defter-i müfredat şerikleri mezburan Hasan Kethüda ve El-hac Mehmed yedlerinden cemʿ 
ve tahsil ve ahz ve kabz itmeleriyle sülüs-ı hisse-i mezkureden müvekkilem mezbure Ayşeye 
intikal ve isabet iden hisse-i ırsıyyesini makbuzları olmağla mezburan Hasan Kethüda ve 
El-hac Mehmed’den ahz murad ile taleb eylediğimde. Ankara Judicial Court Records 135:6. 
(Ottoman judicial court records are held in the National Library of Turkey, in Ankara, and 
are cited by volume and page number.)
Figure 1 Human Networks.
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final destination of the military campaign (the battlefield) and required addi-
tional financial support. In other words, the distance of the battlefield from the 
dirlik was one of the main determinants of the system’s success.
In addition to transportation technology, production technology and the 
mode of tax collection were important factors in the effective functioning of 
the system, because both the schedule and the mode of tax collection were 
functions of technology; this will be examined further in this section.
Ottoman revenues consisted of various taxes, duties, fees, and levies on pro-
duction, trade, and the activities of daily life, and scholars have classified them 
in various ways. While some scholars have distinguished them as Islamic (şerʿi) 
taxes and sultanic (örfi) taxes, others have classified them according to their 
sources: tithes on agricultural and pastoral production, customs dues, and 
market taxes.47 Some scholars, such as Darling, have classified taxes accord-
ing to the recipient of the income.48 Because my focus is on an analysis of the 
timariot’s disposable income, it is logical to categorize taxes in three classes: 
the agricultural tithe (öşr), administrative taxes (niyabet rüsumu), and taxes of 
social status (raiyyet rüsumu). Exploring the collection schedule of these taxes 
will enable us to analyze better the cash flow of the timariot’s income.
The öşr (lit., “one-tenth” in the original Arabic) tax (or tithe)—the rate of 
which varied depending on the productivity of land, irrigation conditions, 
type of agriculture, and the local traditions—usually constituted, according to 
Barkan, one-tenth of the agricultural produce.49 It was collected in kind at the 
end of the harvest season and could not be demanded earlier. The  beginning 
of the harvest season was officially determined by the local kadıs; this was a 
widespread practice. For example, in a court record dated 29 May 1685, the 
local kadı set the official day of the harvest of barley (arpa) as 30 May.50
47   For a detailed description of taxes collected, see L. Fekete, “Türk Vergi Tahrirleri.” Belleten 
11/42 (1947): 299-328; N. Çağatay, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Reayadan Alınan Vergi ve 
Resimler.” AÜDTCFD 5 (1947): 483-511.
48   L. Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration 
in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660 (Leiden: Brill, 1996). She focuses on the group of taxes 
generated from crown lands (havas-ı hümayun), which entered the central government 
directly, before being spent.
49   The öşr tax varied significantly across the empire, for example, one-eighth of the produce 
in Kütahya and one-fifth or one-sixth in Diyarbakır. In Çirmek, the rate was set at one-
fifth for grain production, one-sixth for cotton, one-seventh for fruits, and one-tenth for 
vegetables. Ö.L. Barkan, “Öşür.” In Türkiye’de Toprak Meselesi: 800-1.
50   Bi’l-fiʿl mirmiran-ı Karaman olan . . . Rüstem Paşa hazretlerinin mütesellimi olan . . . Mustafa 
Ağa tarafından . . . Mehmed Ağa ve Konya sancağında Aladağ kazasına tabiʿ Mahmudcalar 
nam karye sakinlerinden Mehmed . . . ve diğer Mehmed . . . nam kimesneler meclis-i şerʿde bir 
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The relation between the peasant and the dirlik owner was founded mainly 
on trust expressed in oral agreements. On the other hand, the rights and obliga-
tions of the dirlik owner toward the state were written down and codified, thus 
limiting dirlik owners’ flexibility in resolving disputes. Prolonged disputes with 
peasants affected directly the dirlik owners’ obligations to the state. Registering 
the official harvest date in the court records was a way to reduce disputes 
over the collection of the öşr tax, but there were other reasons for such a regis-
tration. There were disputes regarding the legal owner of the taxes, in case the 
dirlik owner changed before the collection of taxes. In such cases, the official 
harvest time was the main determinant. The legal owner of the taxes was the 
one who held the grant at harvest time. A decree dated evahir-i Zilhicce 1061 
(mid-December 1651),51 addressed to the kadıs of Ankara, Çukurcak, and other 
kadıs of the subprovince, relates a dispute regarding the collection of the öşr 
tax of lands in Haymana, the revenue of which was granted to Derviş Pasha. 
The agent (kethüda) of Derviş Pasha claims that the peasants had held pay-
ment of the öşr tax due because the revenue grant had been transferred to 
someone else. Apparently, the taxes had been allocated to another timariot 
after harvest. According to the court case, the owner of the right to collect taxes 
at the time of the harvest was the eventual recipient of them. It was ordered 
that the peasants were still obligated to pay the öşr tax to the agent of Derviş 
Pasha, who was the legal owner at the time of the harvest. Although the dirlik 
deste arpa sünbülesi götürüb takrir-i kelam ve taʿ bir-i ʿani’l-meram idüb Konya sancağında 
vakiʿ kaza ve mezraʿda ziraʿat ve haraset olunan mahsulden baʿzısı yetişüb harman olmağa 
kabil olmuşdur yedimizde olan arpa sünbülesine nazar olunub vaki halin tahrir olunması 
matlubumdur didiklerinde baʿde’n-nazar arpa sünbülesi görülüb harman olunmağa kabil 
olduğu mütehhakkik olmağla Konya sancağının hasadı tarih-i kitab senesi Cemaziye’l-
ahiresinin yimi altıncı günü olduğu müteayyin olmağın. Konya Judicial Court Records 33:8.
51   Anadolu eyaletinde bundan akdem vezir-i müşarünileyhin üzerinde iken, mutasarrıf olduğu 
Haymana toprağının 1062 senesinde hasıl olan terekesi mahsulünün vakt-i hasadı tahviline 
düşüp lakin aʿşar-ı şeriyyesi ahz ve kabz olunmayub, reaya üzerinde kalub, eyalet-i mez-
bure ahere verilmek ile, haliya reaya taifesi sene-i mezburede üzerlerinde kalan mahsulü 
virmekde taallül eylediklerin bildirüb, imdi, vakt-i hasadda tereke irişmeyüb, kemalin bulub, 
biçilmek kalil olan zamanda biçmek ve harman olunmak lazım değildir ol zaman vezir-i 
müşarünileyhin zamanında vaki olmuştur. Öşr-ü mahsül anın olur. Buyurdum ki, . . . sene-i 
mezburede terekenin vakt-i hasadı vezir-i müşarünileyhin zamanında olub, ve hass-ı mezbur 
toprağında hasıl olan terekenin öşrü alınmayub, reayanın zimmetlerinde baki kalmış ise, ol 
babda mukteza-i şerʿ-i kavimle amel eyleyüb, reaya zimmetinde baki öşr-ü mahsulü vezir-i 
müşarünileyhin ademisine ahz ve kabz ittirüb, min bad şerʿ-i şerif ve emr-i hümayunuma 
mualif reaya taifesine bir vechile tallül ve inat ittirmeyesüz, amma mukayyed olasız, bu bah-
ane ile reayadan bir senede iki defa mahsul alınmak ihtimali olmaya. Ankara Judicial Court 
Records 38:111.
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owner was, in this case, a pasha, a high state official, similar disputes were com-
mon among timariots as well.
The niyabet rüsumu was an administrative tax, part of which was demanded 
as compensation for the services rendered to reaya, such as the narh akçesi 
(fees charged for determining the prices of the goods sold), the pasban akçesi 
(service charge for the night watch), and the muhtesib akçesi (the cost of exam-
ining the weights and measures of goods sold). The period of collection was 
determined by the law codes. The narh akçesi, for example, was collected twice 
a year, in spring and fall.52 Most of the niyabet rüsumu, however, consisted of 
fines (cerime). Both the amount and the time of its collection could not be 
determined early; in other words, the schedule of the cash flow of the niya-
bet rüsumu was unpredictable. Thus, Ottoman finance officials termed this tax 
bad-i hava or tayyarat, meaning “coming from the air.”
The raiyyet rüsumu also called çift resmi, was a social-status tax, the amount 
of which depended on the marital status of the peasant and the amount of 
land he cultivated. It was collected in cash.53 Inalcık argues that “Ottoman 
agrarian organization was based on the peasant family’s labor (hane) and the 
yoked pair of oxen (çift), which together determined the size and production 
capacity of the land.”54 The Ottoman çift-hane, corresponding to the Roman 
iugum-caput and the Byzantine statis or zugokefalai, as a production unit, 
formed a fiscal unit, consisting of a peasant family farm with two oxen and 
a defined amount of land;55 hence, according to Inalcık, the çift-hane system 
was the fundamental element of Ottoman agricultural production and rural 
society. The agrarian-fiscal system was represented by the çift resmi (peasant-
family tax).56 Christians also paid the farm tax in cash, under the name ispence. 
52   Ö. Ergenc, XVI. Yüzyıl Sonlarında Bursa: 158-63.
53   Çift-resmi was also called kulluk akçası, which, according to Inalcık, discloses its nature 
and origin. “Kulluk refers to the status of being a dependent, or a subject, or services owed 
as such. In this light, çift-resmi becomes the equivalent of the peasant’s obligations to the 
landlord for kulluk or labor service. Fifteenth-century Ottoman law codes for example, 
record the 22, 12, 9, and 6 akça taxes as the cash equivalents of certain labor services (kul-
luk) such as personal service, providing a wagonload of hay, straw, firewood.” H. Inalcık, 
“Osmanlılar’da Raiyyet Rüsumu.” In Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Toplum ve Ekonomi: 31-66. For 
more on çift-resmi, see K. Orbay, “Osmanlı Çift-Hane Sistemi.” Master’s thesis (Ankara: 
Ankara University, 2011).
54   H. Inalcık, “The Çift-Hane System: The Organization of Ottoman Rural Society.” In An 
Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire: 143.
55   Ibid.: 146.
56   The tütün resmi (hearth tax), the dönüm (land) tax, and other minor taxes also fell within 
this system of çift-hane. H. Inalcık, “The Çift-Hane System”: 149.
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Inalcık argues that the çift-resmi was usually collected after the harvest, and, 
according to most of the sixteenth-century law codes, the official date for its 
collection was set at 1 March.57 Although it was a tax that could be collected 
more easily, its share in the total amount of a timariot’s tax income was small, 
for example, 22 akçe for a married peasant.58
Figure 2 summarizes the schedule for the collection of taxes classified as 
öşr, administrative tax, and social-status tax. The main source of income of a 
timariot on campaign was taxes collected in kind, and the schedule of their 
collection was an important determinant of his disposable income. The regu-
lar collection period of the taxes in kind was between August and October. 
It could, however, begin in June or even earlier, depending on the type of grain 
cultivated. If the tax in kind was collected by the end of October and trans-
ported to the warehouse of the timariot or the nearest market, it would still 
require additional time to convert it into cash. The share of the social-status 
tax in total income was, on the other hand, low compared to other taxes. The 
collection schedule of the administrative taxes could not be predicted or set 
in advance. Thus, it is clear that the bulk of the timariot’s disposable income 
57   H. Inalcık, “Osmanlılar’da Raiyyet Rüsumu.” In Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Toplum ve 
Ekonomi: 41.
58   The fiscal system of çift-tax classified peasants as capable of paying the çift tax, the half-
çift tax, the married peasant’s (bennak) tax, or the poor or unmarried peasant’s (mücerred, 
caba, or kara) tax. The amount of raiyyet rüsumu, although it long remained more or less 
stable, changed from place to place. For example, it was 30 akça for Aydın in 1455, 32 
akça for Kütahya in 1528, and 37 akça for Ankara in 1522. For a complete list of these 
rates, see H. Inalcık, “Osmanlılar’da Raiyyet Rüsumu.” In Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Toplum 
ve Ekonomi: 40.
Figure 2 Schedule of Tax Collection.
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constituted of the öşr tax, and the nature and schedule of its collection were 
functions of the production technology. Technology in this system counted as 
a significant nonhuman network in addition to the previously cited human 
networks.
4  The Disposable Income Generation Process of an Ottoman 
Timariot
The military success of the Ottoman timar system, with the obligations of 
timariots to provide military troops in return for tax allocations, depended on 
accumulating enough cash for campaigns. Having previously identified the 
actor networks, Figure 3 analyzes the generation of the disposable income of a 
timar holder, helping us to understand the timariot’s cash flow.
The first line of Figure 3 shows the schedule of the military campaigns dur-
ing the classical period. The campaigns usually began in spring (nevruz) and 
ended in autumn. The timariots had to be back at their sources of revenue to 
collect their tax income, which required that campaigns ended by the end of 
August. Depending on specific conditions, the campaign might start earlier or 
last longer then expected. 
As we have seen in the previous section, agrarian taxes constituted the 
main portion of the timariot’s income. The second line in the figure shows the 
expected harvest period, ranging from June to October. Converting tax in kind 
to cash, however, demanded the sale of grain, usually on credit, which created 
further delays in producing disposable income of the timariot. 
By comparing the campaigning schedule with that of tax collection, the third 
line demonstrates the cash flow of the timariot’s income. At the beginning of 
the military campaign, the timariot’s cash flow is positive, thanks to his accu-
mulated income from the previous year’s tax season. The cost of maintaining 
the timariot’s family was another determinant of the cash accumulated from 
previous years. Although it is not within the scope of this article, the relations 
between the timariot and his family may be regarded as another actor network 
in the system. It seems clear, however, that the cash accumulated from the pre-
ceding year was insufficient to cover all his demands during the campaign. The 
cost of maintaining the cebelüs and their horses added to the financial burden. 
The widespread use of harçlıkçı services is evidence of the desperate need for 
cash during campaigns. This demand required the timariot to hire a harçlıkçı, 
who was expected to deliver either the already-collected tax or an advance on 
the expected tax revenue. The long process of converting tax in kind into cash 
and the length of time it takes for harçlıkçı to deliver cash to the battlefield 
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both indicate additional problems in regulating cash flow during campaigns. 
During the return from campaigning, borrowing (karz tariki ile borç) from the 
state would be inevitable, as a last resort. The flaws within the networks during 
the collection period increased the support required to maintain cash flow. 
Cases of tax disputes, which constitute the majority of judicial court records, 
prove that timariots who were away from their income-generating sources 
during harvest periods needed additional financial support.
 Conclusion
Several documents presented in this paper evidence the practice of making 
cash loans to Ottoman timariots during military campaigns from the early 
sixteenth to the late seventeenth century. The evidence proves that this was 
a regular practice, not an exception. Although it is clear that disbursements 
from the treasury were made as loans to timariots, it is not possible to pre-
cisely determine the extent of the state’s success in their back payment from 
the sources available. Whether the loans were repaid or not, it is clear that it 
was not the salaried standing army only that demanded cash outlays from the 
Ottoman treasury; this refines our understanding of the place of the timar sys-
tem in the Ottoman fiscal regime.
This paper has shown that the Ottoman timar, viewed as a complex system 
of heterogeneous actor networks, was a vulnerable system which necessitated 
the making of loans to help satisfy the timariots’ need for cash as a remedy. 
 A part of the vulnerability was caused by the difficulties faced in the pro-
cess of the generation of the timariot’s disposable income. Taxes on agrarian 
production, which constituted most of the timariot’s revenue, were collected 
Figure 3 Campaign Season versus Disposable 
Income Generation Schedule.
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at harvest time. More importantly, they could be transformed into disposable 
form only by the end of the year which did not perfectly match the campaign-
ing schedule. This mismatch between the timing of harvest and campaign 
however was not the only cause of the timariot’s dependence on cash support. 
It was also independent of the problem of the adequacy of timar allocations. 
Even if the revenues allocated were sufficient, the timing of cash generation 
from tax revenues usually prevented the timariots from covering their expen-
ditures during campaigns.
There were also resistances within the human networks that needed to be 
resolved for the system to function efficiently. Any flaw in the relations of the 
timariot with his agent delegated to collect taxes in his absence, with the peas-
ants, with the bakers in the market, and with his harçlıkçı, each representing a 
different human-actor network, was a threat to the system’s success.
The Ottoman timar system seems to have overcome various resistances 
within actor networks, as reflected in its success during the classical period. 
Scholars have so far demonstrated several reasons for its success. The measures 
taken as a remedy to the vulnerability of the system, evidenced in this paper, 
consisted of the practice of hiring harçlıkçıs to regulate their cash flow and 
cash loans made to timariots during campaigns to facilitate financial problems 
of the timariots. The practice of making loans to timariots was apparently an 
indication of a long-term compromise and negotiation between the state and 
the timariots. When considering holding a dirlik as “a shackle on the feet” and 
“a blinding headache,” the famous Ottoman poet Hayali was perhaps implicitly 
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———. 2014. Nasihatnameler, Iċmal Defterleri, and the Timar-Holding Ottoman 
Elite in the Late Sixteenth Century. Osmanlı Araştırmaları/The Journal of Ottoman 
Studies 43: 193-226.
David, Geza. 2013. Ottoman Armies and Warfare, 1453-1603. In Cambridge History of 
Turkey. Vol. 2: The Ottoman Empire as a World Power, 1453-1603, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi 
and Kate Fleet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 276-320.
David, Geza, and Pal Fodor. 2005. Changes in the Structure and Strength of the Timariot 
Army From the Early Sixteenth to the End of the Seventeenth Century. Eurasian 
Studies 4/2: 157-88.
Deny, Jean. 1936. Timar. EI. Leiden: Brill: 767-76.
Divitçioğlu, Sencer. 1985. Feodalite ve Klasik Dönem Osmanlı Üretim Tarzı. Istanbul: 
Teori.
Duus, Peter. 1993. Feudalism in Japan. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Ergenç, Özer. 1995. Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi Kent Tarihçiliğine Katkı XVI. Yüzyılda Ankara 
ve Konya. Ankara: Ankara Enstitüsü Vakfı Yayınları.
———. 2014 [2006]. XVI. Yüzyıl Sonlarında Bursa. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu.
———. 2012 [1986]. XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Taşra Yönetiminin Mali Nitelikleri. In 
Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları Şehir, Toplum, Devlet. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları: 
367-82.
Fekete, Lajos. 1947. Türk Vergi Tahrirleri. Belleten 11/42: 299-328.
Ganshof, F.L. 1964. Feudalism. Trans. P. Grierson. New York: Harper and Row.
Güven, Mehmet Ali. 2006. 33 No’lu Konya Şeriyye Sicili Değerlendirme ve Transkripsi-
yon. Master’s thesis. Kayseri: Selçuk University.
Hammond, Vincent E. 2009. State Service in Sixteenth Century Novgorod: The First 
Century of the Pomestie System. Lanham MD and Plymouth UK: University Press of 
America.
Hoca Saadettin Efendi. 1869. Tacü’t Tevarih. Vol 2. Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire.
Howard, Douglas. 1987. The Ottoman Timar System and Its Transformation, 1563-1656. 
PhD diss. Bloomington: Indiana University.
Imber, Colin. 2002. The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Inalcık, Halil. 1973. The Provincial Administration and the Timar System. In The 
Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age, 1300-1600, ed. Norman Itzkowitz and Colin 
Imber. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson: 104-18.
———. 1980. Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700. 
Archivum Ottomanicum 6: 283-337.
616 Tekgul
jesho 59 (2016) 590-617
———. 1993 [1952]. 1431 Tarihli Timar Defterine Göre Fatih Devrinden Önce Timar 
Sistemi. In Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Toplum ve Ekonomi Üzerinde Arşiv Çalışmaları, 
İncelemeler. Istanbul: Eren: 109-14.
———. 1993 [1950]. İslam Arazi ve Vergi Sisteminin Teşekkülü ve Osmanlı Devrindeki 
Şekillerle Mukayesesi. In Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Toplum ve Ekonomi Üzerinde Arşiv 
Çalışmaları, İncelemeler. Istanbul: Eren: 15-30.
———. 1993 [1990]. Köy, Köylü ve İmparatorluk. In Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Toplum ve 
Ekonomi Üzerinde Arşiv Çalışmaları, İncelemeler. Istanbul: Eren: 1-14.
———. 1993 [1959]. Osmanlılar’da Raiyyet Rüsumu. In Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Toplum 
ve Ekonomi Üzerinde Arşiv Çalışmaları, İncelemeler. Istanbul: Eren: 31-66.
———. 1994. The Çift-Hane System: The Organization of Ottoman Rural Society. In An 
Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1600, ed. Halil Inalcık and 
Donald Quataert. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 143-54.
———. 2000 [1965]. Adaletnameler. In Osmanlı’da Devlet, Hukuk, Adalet. Istanbul: 
Eren: 75-190.
———. 2000. “Tımar.” In EI2. Leiden: Brill: 502-07.
Inalcık, Halil, and Donald Quataert, ed. 1994. An Economic and Social History of the 
Ottoman Empire, 1300-1600. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
İslamoğlu-İnan, Huri. 1994. State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire: Agrarian Power 
Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia During the 
Sixteenth Century. Leiden: Brill.
Izgi, Şuayib. 2006. 986 (1578) tarihli 32 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri, [s. 201-400], 
Transkripsiyonu ve Değerlendirmesi. Master’s thesis. Istanbul: Marmara University.
Kantorowicz, Ernst H. 1965. Feudalism in the Byzantine Empire. In Feudalism in 
History, ed. Rushton Coulborn. Hamden CT: Archon Books: 151-67.
Kılıç, Filiz, ed. 2010. Aşık Çelebi, Meşairü’ş-Şu’ara, İnceleme-Metin. Istanbul: Istanbul 
Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Yayınları.
Kılıçbay, Mehmet Ali. 1982. Feodalite ve Klasik Dönem Osmanlı Üretim Tarzı. Ankara: 
Gazi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
Köprülü, Mehmet Fuat. 2004 [1931]. Bizans Müesseselerinin Osmanlı Müesseselerine 
Tesiri. Ankara: Akçağ.
Law, John. 1992. Notes on the Theory of the Actor Network: Ordering, Strategy and 
Heterogeneity. Lancester: Centre for Science Studies, Lancaster University. http://
www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/papers/Law-Notes-on-ANT.pdf.
Martin, Janet. 1995. Widows, Welfare, and the “Pomest’e” System in the Sixteenth 
Century. Harvard Ukranian Studies 19: 375-88.
———. 2012. Economic Effectiveness of the Muscovite Pomest’e System: An 
Examination of Estate Incomes and Military Expenses in the Mid-16th Century. 
In Warfare in Eastern Europe, 1500-1800, ed. Brian Davies. Leiden: Brill: 19-34.
 617Cash Loans to Ottoman Timariots during Military Campaigns
jesho 59 (2016) 590-617
Murphey, Rhoads. 1999. Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700. (London: University College 
London Press)
Orbay, Kayhan. 2011. Osmanlı Çift-Hane Sistemi. Master’s thesis. Ankara: Ankara 
University.
Öz, Mehmet. 1999. XV-XVI. Yüzyıllarda Canik Sancağı. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu.
Reynolds, Susan. 1994. Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted. New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Seçilmişler, Töre, and Zekiye Yenen. 2011. Koruma Sorunsalına İlişkin Kuramsal 
Bir Değerlendirme: Kurumsalcı (Alan Yönetimi) ve Çoğulcu (Aktör Ağ Teorisi) 
Yaklaşımlarının Karşılaştırılması. Sigma 3: 375-84.
Singer, Amy. 1994. Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials: Rural Administration 
around Sixteenth‐Century Jerusalem. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Soyudoğan, Muhsin. 2012. Reassessing the Timar System: The Case Study of Vidin 
(1455-1693). PhD diss. Ankara: Bilkent University.
Stenton, Frank M. 1932. The First Century of English Feudalism 1066-1166. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Stephenson, Carl. 1942. Mediaeval Feudalism. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.
Strayer, Joseph R. 1955. Western Europe in Middle Ages: A Short History. New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Strayer, Joseph, and Ruston Coulborn. 1965. The Idea of Feudalism. In Feudalism in 
History, ed. Rushton Coulborn. Hamden CT: Archon Books: 3-11.
Tabakoğlu, Ahmet. 2006. Osmanlı Devletinin İç Hazinesi. In Osmanlı Maliyesi Kurumlar 
ve Bütçeler 1, ed. Mehmet Genç and Erol Özvar. Istanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve 
Araştırma Merkezi.
Turan, Osman. 1993. İkta. Islam Ansiklopedisi. Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı: 949-59.
Üçok, Coşkun. 1944. Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatında Tımarlar. Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk 
Fakültesi Dergisi 1/4: 525-51.
Ünal, Mehmet Ali. 2011. Osmanlı Tarihi Sözlüğü. Istanbul: Paradigma.
Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı. 1978. Osmanlı Devleti Maliyesinin Kuruluşu ve Osmanlı 
Devleti İç Hazinesi. Belleten 42: 67-93.
Veinstein, Gilles. 1983. L’hivernage en campagne: Talon d’Achille du système militaire 
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